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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
AND HEALTH LAW AS PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS
CHANGE
RENÉE M. LANDERS*
ABSTRACT
When elections bring about changes in the political party of the president,
the shifts frequently involve a change in the philosophies that inform the
approach to governing. In teaching constitutional law, administrative law, and
health law, this author cautions students to consider the political content of
agency actions underlying the judicial opinions studied. Examining the political
and discretionary judgment government officials exercise may provide an
explanation for the results or an analysis when the law does not seem to account
for the agency action or court decision. This Article examines the opportunities
available to an incoming administration to undo the work of its predecessor and
the constraints the law imposes on the exercise of discretion. After surveying the
increasing use of the Congressional Review Act to reverse the regulatory actions
of a predecessor administration, Part I of the Article explores other
administrative law tools available to halt or redirect regulatory actions with
which an incoming administration disagrees. Part II examines some of the
signature cases involving judicial review of agency action to illustrate the
constraints courts may impose on changes in administrative policy. Parts III,
IV, and V examine how courts have dealt with policy changes in federal health
care programs and the potential impact of changes in the presidential approach
to the appointment of administrative adjudicators. The Article closes with some
reflections on how this author’s experiences working in state and federal
government have informed her view of government decision-making.

* Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Health and Biomedical Law Concentration and Master of
Science in Law, Life Sciences Program, Suffolk University Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
The substantive content of some fields of law may change markedly
depending on the policies and practices of a presidential administration. At the
federal level, the last two decades have brought shifts in policies and approaches
four times when the political party occupying the White House changed. In
2000, Republican George W. Bush succeeded Democrat Bill Clinton who had
in turn defeated Republican George H.W. Bush; in 2008, Democrat Barack
Obama succeeded Bush; in 2016, Republican Donald Trump succeeded Obama;
and in 2020, Democrat Joseph R. Biden defeated Trump. While all of these shifts
involved a changing political party and governing philosophies, the transitions
from Obama to Trump and Trump to Biden have presented exceptionally sharp,
substantive contrasts in the administration of federal programs and approaches
to policy. In teaching constitutional law, administrative law, and health law over
the years, I have always cautioned students to consider the political content of
agency actions underlying the opinions of reviewing courts. Especially when
legal principles and doctrine do not seem to account fully for the agency action
or the court decision, the political or discretionary judgment government
officials have exercised may provide an explanation. The legitimacy of
government depends on political accountability; thus, election outcomes should
have consequences for the direction and implementation of policy. Examining
which constraints the law imposes on the exercise of official discretion and how
courts use that law to evaluate whether official actions have followed the law
are the salient questions. The transitions between presidential administrations
representing different political parties provide rich opportunities to understand
the interaction between law and politics.
I. USING THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT TO RESCIND REGULATIONS &
POLICIES ADOPTED BY A PRECEDING ADMINISTRATION
The George W. Bush Administration began with Congress using authority
under the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) for the first time to rescind an
agency regulation. 1 In November 2000, during the last few weeks of the Clinton
Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
issued an expansive regulation aimed at preventing ergonomic injuries in the
workplace. The rule was unpopular with business interests, and Bush was
willing to sign the resolution of disapproval in March 2001 after taking office. 2
While OSHA had worked on the rule for ten years, Congress spent less than a
week considering the disapproval resolution. 3 The transition in presidential
1. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (adopted in 1996 as part of the Contract
with America Advancement Act, Pub. L. 104-121).
2. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
3. MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
479 (West Acad. 5th ed. 2020).
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administrations provided the opportunity and political will required to rescind
the workplace safety regulation.
The CRA was Congress’s response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha. 4 In Chadha, the Court
invalidated a statute authorizing either house of Congress to reject an action
suspending an individual’s deportation because the process did not conform to
the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment to the
President. 5
The CRA requires that all rules of general applicability be submitted to
Congress and the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”). Major rules
cannot take effect for at least sixty days after submission—“legislative” days in
the House and “session” days in the Senate. Congress can nullify or rescind any
rule by enacting a joint resolution passed by both houses and signed by the
President or enacted by overriding a Presidential veto. In addition to regulations
adopted through notice and comment rulemaking, the CRA applies to other
agency documents including interpretive rules and policy statements.
A rescission enacted using the CRA process has the effect of prohibiting an
agency from adopting a regulation substantially similar to the disapproved rule
unless Congress enacts legislation allowing the agency to do so. 6 This effect is
known as “salting the earth behind the nullification.” 7
One obvious limitation on Congress’s ability to use the CRA to overturn
regulations is that a President is unlikely to sign a resolution disapproving of an
action their administration has taken. Further, amassing the requisite two-thirds
majority in each house to override a Presidential veto may be challenging for
agency actions having some reservoir of public support. These constraints meant
that no CRA disapproval actions occurred during the remainder of the Bush and
Obama Administrations. Fast-forward to the transition from the Obama
Administration to the Trump Administration, President Trump took office with
an aggressive deregulatory agenda. Ten days after the inauguration, President
Trump signed Executive Order 13,771, which required agencies proposing to

4. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
5. Id. at 923, 928; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1–3 (requiring that bills must pass the House
and the Senate and be presented to the President, that joint resolutions or actions of the House and
Senate together be presented to the President for approval, and if disapproved by the President, that
they be repassed by a two thirds majority each of the House and Senate).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
7. See, e.g., ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 3, at 479; Keith Bradley and Larisa Vaysman,
CRA Resolutions Against Agency Guidance Are Meaningless, REG. REV. (Sept. 20, 2018) (“A ‘rule
that does not take effect (or does not continue)’ thanks to a CRA resolution ‘may not be reissued
in substantially the same form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not
be issued.’ Some lobbyists have called this feature salting the earth on that rule”).
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promulgate a new regulation identifying two regulations to be repealed. 8 The
Executive Order also provided that the net cost of new regulatory activity for the
fiscal year could be no greater than zero. 9 Further, he appointed Neomi Rao, a
conservative lawyer and law professor, to lead the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) in the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”), the component of the White House that oversees agency rulemaking
activities. 10 Rao explained the Trump Administration deregulatory agenda in a
lecture published by the Heritage Foundation in October 2017. 11 The document,
available on the Heritage Foundation website, identifies “key points” from the
lecture:
• America needs a much smaller and more effective regulatory state and a much
more accountable and responsive administration.
• Far too many regulations are a solution in search of a problem rather than a
response to an actual market failure.
• Administrative agencies that operate on their own inertia often create
regulations that are overly burdensome and fail to deliver any real benefits.
• Excessive regulation impedes individual liberty for all Americans, makes it
harder to get a job, and makes it harder to start and maintain a small business.
It makes ordinary goods and services much more expensive and limits choice
in the marketplace. Expansive social regulations can impede choices that are
fundamental to religious exercise and freedom of conscience.
• Reducing these overall regulatory burdens is part of returning government to
its proper and limited role and giving the American people greater control
over their lives, their work, and their property. 12

8. Proclamation No. 9339, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,711 (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.federalregister
.gov/documents/2017/02/03/2017-02451/reducing-regulation-and-controlling-regulatory-costs
(reducing regulation and controlling regulatory costs).
9. Id. at Sec. 2(a), (b).
10. Steven Mufson, Trump’s pick for rules czar would hand more power to Trump, WASH.
POST (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumps-pick-for-rulesczar-is-expected-to-hand-over-more-power-to-trump/2017/04/19/8b33b176-206f-11e7-a0a7-8b2
a45e3dc84_story.html. Rao was confirmed by the Senate for the position on July 10, 2017. Josh
Siegel, Senate confirms Neomi Rao to lead White House office overseeing regulations, WASH.
EXAMINER (July 10, 2017, 8:21 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tag/donald-trump
?source=%2Fsenate-confirms-neomi-rao-to-lead-white-house-office-overseeing-regulations.
Subsequently, Trump nominated Rao to fill the seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, vacated by the elevation of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court.
She joined the court in March 2019. Biography of Neomi Rao, D.C. CIR., https://www.cadc.uscourts
.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+NJR (last visited Nov. 9, 2021).
11. Neomi Rao, The Administrative State and the Structure of the Constitution, Lecture
Delivered to the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/re
port/the-administrative-state-and-the-structure-the-constitution.
12. Id.
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In the lecture, she criticized what she identified as a move away from the
structure for administration of laws established in the Constitution “to a
regulatory state that often operates with minimal congressional guidance,
inconsistent presidential direction, and deferential judicial review.” 13 She called
on Congress to reform its oversight of the regulatory process and for the
judiciary to exercise more probing judicial review, noting that President Trump
had launched the aforementioned regulatory reforms. She wrote, “If each branch
succeeds in its sphere in limiting the reach of regulation, it will promote
individual liberty, restore more accountable government, and ultimately benefit
the American people.” 14
Missing from this agenda for dismantling the administrative state is any
explicit recognition that regulations are creatures of congressional authorization,
responsible for meat inspections and safety, require that drugs approved for
marketing be safe and effective, and protect consumers from unfair banking,
securities, and financial practices, or that industrial activity should not despoil
the air and water to the detriment of public health. 15 Additionally absent is the
recognition that a sound regulatory process would focus on reasoned,
scientifically-informed regulatory decisions that honestly balance the costs and
benefits—including unquantifiable benefits—of specific regulations. 16 Erecting
barriers to any regulation for the simplistic sake of reducing regulation is a recipe
for returning this nation to the conditions portrayed by Upton Sinclair in The
Jungle. 17 In addition, the Rao vision would inhibit progress in a myriad of areas,
such as effecting environmental quality, reducing racial disparities across a wide
range of regulatory activities, and reimagining the application of cost/benefit
analysis. 18 As I tell my students: the Constitution enshrines no right to buy cheap

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Sally Katzen, Regulations: The Unsung Heroes, 42 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 13, 13–14
(2017) (noting that Katzen is Professor of Practice and Distinguished Scholar in Residence, CoDirector of the Legislative and Regulatory Process Clinic, New York University Law School; also
noting Katzen was Director of OIRA during the Clinton Administration).
16. Id.; see also Jonathan S. Masur, Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Trump: A Comment on Dan
Farber’s Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 665, 665, 668
(2019).
17. A 1906 novel describing the meat industry and its working conditions, which ultimately
led to the adoption of the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act. UPTON SINCLAIR,
THE JUNGLE 38 (Grosset & Dunlap 1906).
18. See generally Symposium on Race and Administrative Law, YALE J. ON REGUL., NOTICE
& COMMENT BLOG (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/topic/racism-in-administrative-lawsymposium/. For a critique of the current impact of cost-benefit analysis, see Melissa J. Luttrell &
Jorge Roman-Romero, Regulatory (In)Justice: Racism and CBA Review, in the same symposium,
arguing that, “[b]y increasingly relying on formal CBA as decision-making criterion in health,
safety, and environmental risk regulation, agencies exacerbate racial bias in a socio-economic
landscape already afflicted with systemic racism.” See also Masur, supra note 16, at 668.
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stuff, nor does it establish a right to make as much money as possible in any
given business or economic transaction. The rights for workers who produce the
stuff and the impact of economic activity on the environment are the legitimate
objects of government redress.
Because of the amount of regulatory activity concluded during the final
months of the Obama administration, and because the CRA subjects regulations
to disapproval actions for sixty days on legislative calendars however
determined by each house, any regulation adopted by an Obama Administration
agency after about May 25, 2016, was vulnerable to a CRA disapproval
resolution when Trump succeeded Obama in January 2017. This window to
eliminate rules antithetical to the regulatory philosophy of the new
administration closed in mid-May 2017.
By the time Rao took office as OIRA Director, just four months into the
Trump Administration, Congress had adopted, and President Trump had signed,
fourteen disapproval resolutions. Among the regulations rescinded were the
Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) regulation protecting consumer
privacy 19 and a Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) rule
protecting access to federal funding for reproductive health care organizations
that provide abortions. 20 Other rules rescinded included several environmental
protections and financial services rules. 21 One proposed disapproval resolution
failed when three Republican Senators joined all Democrats in voting against
the effort to rescind a methane emissions rule promulgated by the Department
of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management. 22
In addition to these regulations rescinded in the early months of the Trump
Administration, Congress and President Trump worked together to use the CRA
to rescind a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) guidance bulletin
on auto lending and compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 23 The
CFPB adopted this bulletin in March 2013 under the leadership of Richard
Cordray, who was appointed director by President Obama. 24 Even though this
19. Exec. Order No. 87,274, 47 C.F.R. § 64 (2016), overturned by S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong.
(2017) (enacted).
20. Exec. Order No. 91,852, 42 C.F.R. § 59 (2016), overturned by H.J. Res. 43, 115th Cong.
(2017) (enacted).
21. For a complete list of federal agency rules repealed under the CRA through June 30, 2021,
see Federal Agency Rules Repealed Under the Congressional Review Act, BALLOTPEDIA (2021),
https://ballotpedia.org/Federal_agency_rules_repealed_under_the_Congressional_Review_Act.
22. Juliet Eilperin & Chelsea Harvey, Senate Unexpectedly Rejects Bid to Repeal a Key
Obama-era Environmental Regulation, WASH. POST (May 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/10/senates-poised-to-repeal-a-final-obama-era-ruleas-soon-as-wednesday/.
23. MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43992, THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 26 (2021).
24. Bureau of Financial Protection notice that the bulletin had been rescinded. See also Kris
D. Kully et al., Congress Invalidates CFPB’s Indirect Auto Lending Guidance, CONSUMER FIN.
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rescission did not occur during a transition period, this example fits the pattern
of a subsequent administration overturning the predecessor’s regulatory
position.
The Congressional Research Service estimated that rules submitted to
Congress by the Trump Administration on or after August 21, 2020, would be
vulnerable to CRA review in the 117th Congress elected in 2020 with
Democratic majorities in both houses and with a Democrat, Joseph R. Biden, as
President. 25 Three regulations have been subject to disapproval under the CRA
process during the Biden Administration. 26 In addition, on January 20, 2021,
President Biden issued an Executive Order revoking the executive orders
relating to regulatory practices issued by President Trump. 27 In a four year span,
the CRA has been used extensively to reject the regulatory enactments of the
immediately preceding administration. If one of the goals of the regulatory state
is to establish consistent and predictable standards, compliance with which
regulated entities and the public are able to rely in structuring their activities,
then the increased reliance on the ability to undo what the previous President has
done is not serving that purpose. Commentators have noted that the CRA process
advantages well-organized industry and other interest groups by providing an
opportunity to overturn a regulatory outcome they find disagreeable. 28 On the
other hand, responding to the views of the electorate as divined from the
outcomes of presidential elections seems to be consistent with some notions of
political accountability. How a society and an economy can function with such
dramatic fluctuations in regulatory policy causes one to consider what the
constraints are on politics and regulatory ideology as the guideposts for
acceptable administrative action.
Before use of the CRA emerged as a major tool for reversing regulatory
outcomes, incoming administrations routinely employed a variety of
mechanisms to prevent the implementation of policies propounded by prior
SERVS. REV. (May 18, 2018), https://www.cfsreview.com/2018/05/congress-invalidates-cfpbs-in
direct-auto-lending-guidance/.
25. MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46690,
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT ISSUES FOR THE 177TH CONGRESS: THE LOOK-BACK MECHANISM
AND EFFECTS OF DISAPPROVAL (2021).
26. See supra note 21 (showing Regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
were all rescinded on June 30, 2021).
27. Exec. Order No. 13,992, 86 Fed. Reg. 7049 (Jan. 25, 2021) (revoking six executive orders
issued by President Trump related to administrative regulation). See also Presidential Executive
Order 13992 (Joe Biden, 2021), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_Executive
_Order_13992_(Joe_Biden,_2021) (last visited Oct. 24, 2021). To the extent that agencies may
have acted in response to the Trump executive orders, the agencies may need to take further steps
to comply with the Biden executive order. For example, an agency that issued any rules issued
using notice and comment rulemaking would need to use that same process to revoke those policies.
28. See, e.g., ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 3, at 479.
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administrations. The incoming president’s chief of staff typically issued
instructions in a memorandum to agencies, ordering the withdrawal,
modification, or replacement of final rules published but with delayed effective
dates. 29 New administrations have also abandoned the defense of statutes or
regulations to which the administration is opposed, for example, the Biden
Administration’s refusal to continue supporting the challenge to the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) initiated by numerous states after Congress reduced the tax
penalty for failure to comply with the requirement to have health insurance to
zero. 30 A successor administration could also diminish the impact of a rule to
which it is opposed through lax enforcement without repealing rules. A new
administration can slow down or curtail rulemakings in progress. One obvious
step would be to initiate new rulemakings to rescind existing regulations or adopt
new ones. The Trump Administration’s EPA replacing the Obama Clean Power
Plan with a different rule is one example of this approach. 31 Emphasizing this
range of options serves to prepare law students for future situations that may call
for identifying or using these techniques to maintain or change regulatory
directions.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW & LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE
ACCOUNTABILITY
Beyond the internal agency processes, resort to judicial review has been the
traditional source of constraint on the actions of administrative agencies despite
Neomi Rao’s skepticism about its utility. What role political justifications
should play in that process is an interesting issue for students to explore.
The situation leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency is one example where the judiciary
confronted the intersection of law and politics. 32 Massachusetts, along with other
states, local governments, and private organizations, petitioned the EPA to
regulate certain emissions of motor vehicles to help reduce global warming. 33 A
provision of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) required the EPA administrator to issue
29. Reince Preibus (Trump), Rahm Emanuel (Obama), and Andrew Card (George W. Bush)
issued similar memoranda.
30. Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solic. Gen., to Scott S. Harris, Clerk of the U.S.
Supreme Court (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-840/168649/20
210210151147983_19-840%2019-1019%20CA%20v%20TX.pdf (“Following the change in
Administration, the Department of Justice has reconsidered the government’s position in these
cases. The purpose of this letter is to notify the Court that the United States no longer adheres to
the conclusions in the previously filed brief of the federal respondents.”).
31. Umair Irfan, Trump’s EPA Just Replaced Obama’s Signature Climate Policy with a Much
Weaker Rule, VOX (June 19, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/6/19/18684054/climate-changeclean-power-plan-repeal-affordable-emissions.
32. 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007).
33. Id. at 505.
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regulations prescribing standards for emissions of air pollutants from new motor
vehicles upon determining “in his judgment” that the emissions “cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare. . . .” 34 A separate section of the statute defined the term
“air pollutant.” 35 The EPA under President George W. Bush refused to regulate
new motor vehicle emissions because it determined that the term “air pollutant”
did not encompass greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, and because the
connection between greenhouse gases and global warming had not been
“unequivocally established.” 36 As additional justification for its refusal to act,
the agency cited the policy approaches of the President, indicating that
regulations “would conflict with the President’s comprehensive approach to the
problem of climate change, such as the creation of nonregulatory programs to
encourage voluntary private sector reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, and
might hamper the President’s ability to persuade developing nations to reduce
emissions.” 37
After first concluding that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the
EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition, 38 the Court then ruled that the
definition of “air pollutant” in the statute encompassed greenhouse gases, such
as carbon dioxide, and that the EPA Administrator was required to exercise
“judgment” “within defined statutory limits.” 39 The Court stated that “once EPA
has responded to a petition for rulemaking, its reasons for action or inaction must
conform to the authorizing statute.” 40 According to the Court, under the CAA,
EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases
do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation
as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they
do. . . . To the extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue other
priorities of the Administrator or the President, this is the congressional
design. 41

The Court rejected the reasons the EPA offered for not regulating as being
irrelevant to the statutory instruction that the EPA render “a scientific judgment”
and ruled that the agency’s failure to reach a conclusion was arbitrary and
capricious. 42
In his dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the reasons the EPA provided for not
acting “are surely considerations executive agencies regularly take into account
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
Id. § 7602(g).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513.
Id. at 513–14.
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 520–21, 526 (2007).
Id. at 532–33.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
Id. at 535.
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(and ought to take into account) when deciding whether to consider entering a
new field: the impact such entry would have on other Executive Branch
programs and on foreign policy.” 43 The dissenters did not read the statute as
imposing a requirement that the Administrator reach a judgment. Additionally,
the dissent did not read the statute as foreclosing the policy justifications the
EPA offered for refusing to act. 44 The dissent did not discuss the purpose of the
CAA provision of improving air quality and promoting health in the long term.
Perhaps this omission was a signal that the Justices in the dissent did not agree
with the congressional objective embodied in the provision of the CAA.
After the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts, the Bush
Administration managed to avoid acting before leaving office. Soon after taking
office in 2009, the Obama Administration made the finding that greenhouse
emissions endanger public health and welfare as the Court’s decision seemed to
direct. 45 The Massachusetts majority viewed its role as enforcing the
congressional directive that the government act with more urgency to mitigate
climate change and its effects, imposing a legal constraint on the exercise of
political discretion by the Bush Administration.
Earlier, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed a rulemaking decision of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) regarding whether the agency would require
installation of airbags or seatbelts—passive restraints—to reduce the number of
deaths and injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents. 46 Michael Asimow
and Ronald M. Levin give an account of the rulemaking proceeding which
involved sixty rulemaking notices spanning across the Carter and Reagan
Administrations. 47 “A passive restraint requirement was imposed, amended,
rescinded, and reimposed.” 48 In 1977, NHTSA adopted a standard requiring that
cars produced after 1982 be equipped with passive restraints. 49 After the Reagan
Administration took office in 1981, the agency delayed the effective date of the
requirement and then rescinded it after notice and comment rulemaking. 50 To
make a long story short, in the State Farm decision, the Court ruled that
NHTSA’s rescission of the standard was arbitrary and capricious. 51

43. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 552 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009).
46. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34–35 (1983).
47. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 3, at 665.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983).
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Significantly, in his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, thenJustice Rehnquist described the NHTSA rulemaking with refreshingly honest
reference to the impact of politics on the agency’s decision to rescind the passive
restraints standard:
The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election
of a new President of a different political party. It is readily apparent that the
responsible members of one administration may consider public resistance and
uncertainties to be more important than do their counterparts in a previous
administration. A change in administration brought about by the people casting
their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal
of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency
remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess
administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the
administration. 52

The Rehnquist opinion acknowledged in a footnote that “[o]f course, a new
administration may not refuse to enforce laws of which it does not approve, or
to ignore statutory standards in carrying out its regulatory functions.” 53As
Christopher F. Edley, Jr., has observed,
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in State Farm is striking for two reasons. It is both
a descriptive acknowledgment that politics was an ingredient of the deregulatory
decision at issue and a normative assertion that politics has a legitimate place in
sound agency decision making. These points are all the more striking because
they contrast sharply with the total absence from Justice White’s majority
opinion of any mention of politics. . . . President Reagan’s electoral victory,
which included a significant campaign emphasis on deregulation, was simply
irrelevant. . . . There was . . . no mention of politics. 54

Edley goes on to note that Rehnquist’s observation is an implicit
acknowledgement “that the political reality which is often the explanation for a
major policy shift should not be ignored in the process of judicial review.” 55 As
I have instructed students, “the political story is just as important to
understanding the ‘reasons and findings’ of the agency and the ‘basis and
purpose’ of its action.” 56
Elsewhere in his analysis, Edley points out the implicit role of politics and
the preferences or “bias[es]” of the decision-maker in the cases regarding
whether strongly held policy views disqualify an agency official from
participating in a rulemaking proceeding. 57 “Impartial, however, does not mean

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
Id. at 59 n.8.
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 183 (1990).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179–80.
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uninformed, unthinking, or inarticulate.” 58 A concurring opinion in Association
of National Advertisers noted that an agency could not even begin to conduct a
rulemaking proceeding unless it had formed an opinion that some problem
existed requiring a regulatory response. 59 Similarly, in an opinion by Judge
Patricia Wald in Sierra Club v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit noted the desirability of
presidential supervision and influence on agency decision-makers and the
legitimacy of congressional communications of viewpoints in rulemaking
proceedings. 60 This role for politics is consistent with the rule of law if agency
decision-makers hew to their statutory mandates and reviewing courts hold
agencies accountable. 61
III. LAW & POLITICS RELATING TO MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENTS
One issue on which Republican Presidents and governors have pursued
different objectives than Democrats is in the administration of the Medicaid
program. The most striking example of this difference in viewpoint is the failure
of twelve states led by Republican officials to adopt the expansion of the
Medicaid program authorized in the ACA. 62 Outside the expansion opportunity
that the ACA made available, state Medicaid programs exhibit a great deal of
variation, and the Medicaid statute additionally makes provision for states to
apply for waivers from certain program elements for demonstration projects. 63
States have used waivers to experiment with different coverage options,
financing, and delivery reforms. 64 The statute authorizes the Secretary of HHS
to approve “any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the
judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of

58. Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 627 F.2d 1151, 1173–74 (D.C. Cir.
1983). In this case, the court rejected the notion that the rules ensuring the impartiality of
adjudicators should apply in rulemaking situations.
59. Id. at 1176 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
60. 657 F.2d 298, 311, 406, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
61. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. States were able to decline to participate in the Medicaid expansion as a result of the
Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, which held
that the federal government could not condition continued receipt of a state’s payment under the
traditional Medicaid program on the state’s agreement to cover the expansion population of certain
low-income adults. 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012). See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions:
Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/. While some states having
Republican leadership have adopted the Medicaid expansion, all of the remaining states have
Republican governors or legislative majorities, or both.
63. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE
435 (8th ed. 2018).
64. Id.
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Medicaid. 65 During the Trump Administration, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services in HHS approved state requests to attach work requirements
to the eligibility criteria for Medicaid. 66 The notion of work requirements echoes
the efforts since colonial times to ensure that public support is not expended on
the “sturdy beggar,” “the able-bodied [adult],” or the freeloader who just
chooses not to maintain gainful employment. 67
In February 2020, the D.C. Circuit in Gresham v. Azar invalidated the
Arkansas waiver approved by HHS Secretary, Alex Azar, which authorized
Arkansas to impose work requirements as inconsistent with the primary purpose
of the Medicaid statute. 68 The statute provides that the purpose of Medicaid is
[T]o furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children
and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2)
rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals attain or
retain capability for independence or self-care. 69

The HHS letter approving the Arkansas waiver identified three objectives that
Secretary Azar asserted Arkansas Works would promote: improving health
outcomes; addressing behavioral and social factors that influence health
outcomes; and incentivizing beneficiaries to engage in their own health care and
achieve better health outcomes. The approval letter opined that the Arkansas
community engagement requirements would encourage beneficiaries to obtain
and maintain employment or other activities that correlate with improved health
and wellness. 70

65. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-trackerapproved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/.
66. See, e.g., Trump Administration Approves Innovative State-Led Health Reform to Expand
and Strengthen Coverage for Georgia Residents, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct.
15, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/trump-administration-approves-innova
tive-state-led-health-reform-expand-and-strengthen-coverage. Federal officials have approved
work requirement proposals in seven states—Arizona, Arkansas (invalidated by court), Indiana,
Kentucky (invalidated/withdrawn), Michigan (invalidated), New Hampshire (invalidated), and
Wisconsin. In each of those states, the requirements would apply only to people who gained
Medicaid coverage under the expansion authorized by the ACA. “Ten other states—Alabama,
Kansas, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah and
Virginia—also have requested approval. Some of those states have not expanded Medicaid and are
seeking to add work requirements to their regular programs.” Phil Galewitz, Judge Vows to Rule
on Medicaid Work Requirements by End of March, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://khn.org/news/judge-vows-to-rule-on-medicaid-work-requirements-by-end-of-march/.
67. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 49, 185 (Oxford Univ. Press
4th ed. 2019).
68. 950 F.3d 93, 93, 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1396–1.
70. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 97.
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In the Gresham opinion by Judge Sentelle, the D.C. Circuit panel also
rejected HHS’s argument that the Secretary’s discretion in granting waivers was
unreviewable 71 and certified that the APA exception from judicial review for an
action committed to agency discretion is “very narrow.” 72 The court stated that
the Medicaid statute reflected Congress’s clear purpose to provide health care
coverage, and that under Chevron, the agency was required to give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 73 The opinion rejected an effort to
characterize the Secretary’s approval as helping the Medicaid population gain
financial resources to purchase insurance, calling it a “post hoc rationalization[]”
by the agency. 74
The final part of the court’s opinion concluded that the approvals of the
Arkansas work requirements were arbitrary and capricious for failure to address
important aspects of the problem. 75 Here, the court noted the agency’s failure to
account for loss of coverage—“a matter of importance under the statute.” 76
About twenty-five percent of persons subject to work requirements lost coverage
in five months. The court noted that while “it is not arbitrary and capricious to
prioritize one statutorily identified objective over another, it is an entirely
different matter to prioritize non-statutory objectives to the exclusion of the
statutory purpose.” 77
The Gresham case demonstrates that while reviewing courts may
acknowledge political philosophy or politics as a motivation or component of a
regulatory decision, courts are capable of requiring agencies to stay within the
confines of the statutory mandate. Thus, a new administration does not have
license to disregard what Congress has enacted, however much it might disagree
with the policy. 78

71. Id. at 98 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971)).
72. Id. (citing Dep’t of Commerce v. N.Y., 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019)).
73. Gresham v. Azer, 950 F.3d 93, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
74. Id. at 101 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 50, 103 (1983)).
75. Id. at 102–03 (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
76. Id. at 102.
77. Id. at 102, 104.
78. As discussed in Part III of this Article, the Arkansas work requirement demonstration
project had been invalidated in the Gresham case. Based on the D.C. Circuit decision in Gresham,
the HHS approval of New Hampshire work requirements was also invalidated. Philbrick v. Azar,
No. 19-773 (D. D.C., July 29, 2019). The Supreme Court granted petitions to review the cases in
December 2020. Subsequent events illustrate the impact of the transition from a president of one
political party to another on substantive policy. On March 17, 2021, after President Biden took
office, HHS informed Arkansas and New Hampshire that it would withdraw approval of the work
requirements. Based on these developments, on April 1, 2022, the government asked the Court to
vacate the judgments below with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot and remand the
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IV. OBAMA & TRUMP RULEMAKING ON NONDISCRIMINATION IN HEALTHCARE
Section 1557 of the ACA, enacted in 2010, specifically prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability
in certain health programs or activities. This provision builds on other federal
civil rights laws—Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975—and extends nondiscrimination
protections to individuals participating in any of the following:
• Any health program or activity receiving funding from HHS
• Any health program or activity that HHS itself administers
• Health insurance marketplaces and all plans offered by issuers that participate
in those marketplaces. 79

During the Obama Administration, the HHS Office of Civil Rights engaged in a
rulemaking process to implement Section 1557. In an extensive Final Rule
issued in 2016, HHS addressed existing nondiscrimination requirements and
turned a particular focus on the prohibition of sex discrimination in health
programs. 80 The principal area of contention focused on the regulation’s
definition of sex discrimination as a source of protection for lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender individuals who, like people of color, society has
historically categorized as “other.”
A coalition of states and healthcare providers successfully challenged the
2016 Rule in the Northern District of Texas, arguing that HHS exceeded its
authority under Section 1557 in defining discrimination “on the basis of sex” to
include discrimination based on gender identity. In Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v.
Burwell, the court enjoined enforcement of that provision of the rules on
December 31, 2016, holding that the HHS definition was not entitled to Chevron
deference because the text of the statute was neither silent nor ambiguous. 81
After Trump took office in January 2017, HHS did not appeal the preliminary
injunction and the rules were subsequently vacated. 82
By 2020, HHS had completed a rulemaking to replace the vacated 2016
Rule. The 2020 Rule eliminated the provision protecting patients from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. 83 After HHS
underlying matters to the Secretary of HHS. Suggestion of mootness and motion to vacate the
judgments of the court of appeals and to remand. The Court granted this motion on April 18, 2022.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
80. FURROW ET AL., supra note 63, at 223 (describing Final Rule, Nondiscrimination in Health
Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375 (May 18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 92)).
81. 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 670, 685, 687, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (discussed in Walker v. Azar,
480 F. Supp. 3d 417, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)).
82. Walker, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 421–22.
83. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities: Delegation of
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,160–62 (June 19, 2020) (effective Aug. 18, 2020).
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submitted the new rule for publication, but before its effective date, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, which
concluded that discrimination on the basis of sex encompassed discrimination
based on both sexual orientation and gender identity. 84 HHS stubbornly declined
to withdraw the rule despite the Supreme Court’s decision.
On August 17, 2020, in a challenge brought by two transgender women, a
federal district court in New York enjoined the 2020 repeal of the definition of
discrimination on the basis of sex in the 2016 Rule, holding that the repeal was
contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to
consider what would be an important aspect of the problem under the State Farm
decision—the Bostock decision. 85 Along the way to this seemingly obvious
conclusion, the district judge noted that the agency’s apparent confidence that
the Supreme Court would endorse the administration’s interpretation of sex
discrimination “was misplaced” and that the agency’s argument that the rule
remained valid was “disingenuous.” 86 The upshot is that the Walker decision did
not revive the “gender identity” protection previously vacated in the Franciscan
Alliance case, but the 2016 definitions of “gender identity” and “sex
stereotyping” remain in effect. 87
V. POLITICIZING THE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES IN THE
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
One additional area in which the Trump Administration entered new
territory was in asserting an enlarged role for the White House in the process for
appointing administrative law judges serving on the Board of Veterans Appeals.
These administrative judges rule on applications by veterans for compensation
based on claims of service-related disabilities. While examining the
considerable practical and constitutional issues that plague the appointment
processes for administrative law judges and other agency adjudicators is beyond
the scope of this Article, interjecting the consideration of political party
affiliations and other political activities has not been a part of the vetting process
historically. In October 2018, the Washington Post reported that the White
House had rejected half of the candidates the Veterans Administration presented
for appointment as administrative law judges. 88 According to the article, the

84. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1744 (2020).
85. Walker, F. Supp. 3d at 424, 430.
86. Id. at 424, 428.
87. Katie Keith, Court Vacates New 1557 Rule That Would Roll Back Antidiscrimination
Protections for LGBT Individuals, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.healthaf
fairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200818.468025/full/.
88. Lisa Rein, ‘I’ve never seen these positions politicized’: White House Rejection of Veterans
Judges Raises Concerns of Partisanship, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/ive-never-seen-these-positions-politicized-white-house-rejection-of-veterans-
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White House asked candidates to “provide links to their social media profiles
and disclose whether they had ever given a speech to Congress, spoken at a
political convention, appeared on talk radio, or published an opinion piece in a
conservative forum such as Breitbart News or a liberal one such as Mother
Jones.” 89 The rejected applicants were three Democrats and one independent,
while the four accepted were three Republicans and an independent who had
voted in GOP primaries. 90 The article recounted other efforts to neutralize the
“nonpartisan civil service” and place people loyal to the administration in
positions not typically the focus of the White House appointments process. 91
This approach to routine appointments, if it persists, has the potential to result
in hollowing out the expertise of the career civil servants whose knowledge of
the work of agencies keeps the government functioning through the transitions
from one presidential administration to another. In addition, politicization of
administrative adjudicators could undermine public confidence in the fair
administration of programs, such as Veterans Administration or Social Security
benefits.
VI. REFLECTIONS INFORMED BY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH FEDERAL
AGENCIES
In November 1993, I took a hiatus from teaching law to serve as Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in what is now the Office of Legal Policy in the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) during the Clinton Administration. I arrived after
the transition from the George H.W. Bush Administration, and the institution
was still adjusting to a new set of governing priorities after twelve years of
Republican administrations, starting with Ronald Reagan in 1980. Different
ideas about nominations for federal judicial positions and for litigating positions
on civil rights cases required some recalibration by the career employees of the
Department to account for the differing views of the new Democratic President
whose political appointees brought diverse backgrounds to the Administration.
For example, President Clinton appointed the first woman to lead the DOJ
as Attorney General, Janet Reno, and a woman, Jamie Gorelick, was the Deputy
Attorney General. Of the eleven Assistant Attorneys General, seven were
women. 92 Emphasizing enforcement of new laws such as the Violence Against
Women Act and the Child Support Enforcement Act in addition to longstanding
federal prosecutorial efforts changed as a result.

judges-raises-concerns-of-partisanship/2018/10/23/f488046a-ce51-11e8-920f-dd52e1ae4570
_story.html.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Victoria L. Radd, Women of Justice: Reflections, HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 2, 4 (1995).
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In 1995, I became Deputy General Counsel of the Department of HHS,
serving with Harriet S. Rabb, who was General Counsel, and Secretary Donna
Shalala. I am not one to think that all women bring different leadership styles to
organizations than men; like Maureen Dowd said, it does depend on the
person, 93 but working for organizations led by women was a unique and
refreshing experience.
Shortly after starting, DOJ held a conference for all the U.S. Attorneys. After
dinner one evening, I found myself in the women’s restroom washing my hands
next to the Attorney General. A prosaic example, but it was the first time—
perhaps the only time—where I have shared a restroom with the head of the
organization where I worked. The most important thing I learned from Attorney
General Reno was that law does not provide an answer to all of society’s ills.
Most significantly, good schools, social work supports, and economic security
provide the foundations for productive lives. The criminal justice system often
addresses society’s failure to sustain the aspirations and vitality of ordinary
Americans.
Secretary Shalala always saw the path forward for making practical
progress. She believed in having lawyers at the table from the beginning of a
project—her rationale was that it was not helpful to the project or the reputation
of lawyers to have them come in when a proposal was already formed, only to
explain why the law did not permit whatever was proposed. The General
Counsel, Harriet Rabb, was an amazing boss. She referred to everyone who
worked “with” her as a “colleague”—we were all a team; we did not “work for
her.”
What remarkable examples these women were. I am glad to be writing these
reflections as a reminder to myself of how to conduct my own professional
relationships now. These experiences also confirmed what I knew from having
worked in Massachusetts State Government before going to law school—the
career employees at every level of government are reliable anchors amidst the
fluctuations in policy emphasis and political philosophies that arrive periodically
after elections. The public is fortunate to be able to rely on people who are
dedicated to the mission of their agencies and to the rule of law.
After leaving the government and a return trip through private practice, I
became a law professor again in 2002, after the transition from Clinton to Bush.
As the nation marks the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and the new era of
security surveillance, that transition appears more significant in the rear-view
mirror than it did at the time.
93. Maureen Dowd, Manning Up, Letting Us Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/11/opinion/september-11-masculinity.html (“I’m not one of
those people who think women make naturally better leaders than men, more collegial and
collaborative. I’ve covered enough women in the upper ranks, and worked for and with enough
women, to know that it depends on the individual.”).
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These experiences have given me some sense of what the transition in
administrations is like from the inside. As a law teacher, I have had experience
adapting course content to account for the different perspectives of
administrations. My aim in this Article was to convey some of the ways in which
changes in administration, illustrated by examples from the transitions of Bushto-Obama-to-Trump-to-Biden, provide the opportunity to help students
understand the interplay among politics, law, and policy and the obligations of
government lawyers and other employees in navigating the shifts. The examples
also illustrate that who the people are in government roles makes a difference.
Appointees in administrations may bring ideological viewpoints and particular
governing philosophies, but the statutes to be enforced and procedures they are
required to follow impose real constraints. 94 The ability of the officials of any
administration to use the required procedures to achieve their goals and to justify
their actions reflects on their ability to govern competently and effectively. 95
Substantively, officials have some obligation to fulfill the missions of the
agencies they lead according to the terms of the governing statutes. 96 Carl
Sandburg’s poem, Government, describes directly through examples that
“Everywhere . . . Government is a thing made of men”:
GOVERNMENT
THE Government—I heard about the
Government and I went out to find
it. I said I would look closely at it
when I saw it.
Then I saw a policeman dragging a
drunken man to the callaboose. It
was the Government in action.
I saw a ward alderman slip into an
office one morning and talk with a
judge. Later in the day the judge
dismissed a case against a
pickpocket who was a live ward
worker for the alderman. Again I
94. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (requiring agencies to follow
certain procedures in promulgating rules and to provide reasoned decisions for the rulemaking
decisions made. Failure to adhere to these requirements will often cause reviewing courts to
invalidate agency decisions); Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump
Administration Is Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court
/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html.
95. Barbash & Paul, supra note 94.
96. See, e.g., discussion supra Section II regarding Massachusetts and Section III regarding
Gresham.
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saw this was the Government,
doing things.
I saw militiamen level their rifles at a
crowd of workingmen who were
trying to get other workingmen to
stay away from a shop where there
was a strike on. Government in
action.
Everywhere I saw that Government is
a thing made of men, that
Government has blood and bones,
it is many mouths whispering into
many ears, sending telegrams,
aiming rifles, writing orders, saying
“yes” and “no.”
Government dies as the men who form
it die and are laid away in their
graves and the new Government
that comes after is human, made of
heartbeats of blood, ambitions,
lusts, and money running through it
all, money paid and money taken,
and money covered up and spoken
of with hushed voices.
A Government is just as secret and
mysterious and sensitive as any
human sinner carrying a load of
germs, traditions and corpuscles
handed down from fathers and
mothers away back. 97
The effect of transitions in presidential administrations on law and policy are
further evidence that the quality and integrity of the people appointed to lead
make all the difference.

97. Carl Sandburg, Government, CARL SANDBURG POEMS, http://www.carl-sandburg.com
/government.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).

